“Historic” is an adjective used too often these days, at the risk of trivialising the word and diluting its substance. But Sunday’s Hungarian election, which marked the fall of Viktor Orbán after 16 years in power, deserves the label. The chief architect of European illiberalism, the man who dismantled Hungary’s rule of law, presided over a system of endemic corruption and stood as an avowed enemy of Ukraine is gone.
“istoric”这个形容词如今被用得太频繁，冒着让这个词变得轻描淡写、削弱其内涵的风险。但周日的匈牙利选举 ，标志着维克多·欧尔班执政 16 年后的垮台，理应被贴上这个标签。这位欧洲非自由主义的主要设计者，那个拆解匈牙利法治、领导着普遍腐败体系并公开反对乌克兰的人已经不在了。

The scale of the moment is undeniable. For Ukraine and for the European project, the relief is palpable. With an election turnout of 79.5% – the highest the country has seen since the fall of the USSR – and a strong mobilisation of the youth vote, the Hungarian people have delivered a clear mandate for change. Despite the explicit support of Donald Trump and the Maga-sphere, despite an electoral map gerrymandered in his favour and a locked-down media landscape, Orbán lost. What is more, he lost so decisively that he was forced to concede immediately. There is, without a doubt, reason for enthusiasts of liberal democracy to celebrate – a “Budapest spring” in its own right.
这一刻的规模毋庸置疑。对乌克兰和欧洲项目来说，这种宽慰感是显而易见的。匈牙利人民以 79.5% 的投票率——这是苏联解体以来的最高水平——以及青年选民的强力动员，明确地传递了变革的授权。尽管唐纳德·特朗普和马加圈子明确支持，尽管选举选区划分被划偏向他，媒体环境封锁，欧尔班还是落败了。更何况，他输得如此彻底，以至于被迫立即认输 。毫无疑问，自由民主的爱好者有理由庆祝——一个本身就有“布达佩斯之春”。

However, we must be wary of the baggage this “historic” label carries. We should not expect too much, too soon. We are dealing with “long history” here – one election cannot bring about an instant return to liberal democracy. Experience across Europe shows that these national-populist episodes are not mere parentheses; they leave deep scars that take years to heal.
然而，我们必须警惕这个“历史”标签所承载的包袱。我们不应期望过高，也不应过早。我们这里面对的是“漫长历史”——一次选举无法立即回归自由民主。 欧洲各地的经验表明，这些民族民粹主义事件并非简单的括号;它们会留下需要多年才能愈合的深深疤痕。

Poland’s example shows this process will take time. When Donald Tusk’s Civic Coalition defeated the Law and Justice (PiS) party in 2023, there was a similar euphoria. Yet more than two years later, the rule of law in Poland is still not fully restored and PiS remains a potent force: it is the largest parliamentary group by number of seats and the Polish president, Karol Nawrocki, is backed by the party. This “Polish paradox” stems from the inherent tension of attempting to dismantle an illiberal system while respecting the very democratic principles one is seeking to restore. As we discovered in our recent research for Institut Montaigne, the Tusk government faced a dilemma: how could it correct the judicial appointments and decisions of the past decade without undermining legal certainty or violating procedural safeguards?
波兰的例子表明，这一过程需要时间。当唐纳德·图斯克领导的公民联盟在 2023 年击败法律与正义党（PiS）时，也引发了类似的狂喜。然而，两年多过去了，波兰的法治尚未完全恢复 ，PiS 依然是一股强大的力量：它是议会中席位数最大的党团，波兰总统卡罗尔·纳沃罗茨基也得到了该党的支持。这种“波兰悖论”源于在试图拆解一个非自由体制的同时，尊重人们试图恢复的民主原则之间的固有张力。正如我们在蒙田学院最近的研究中发现的，塔斯克政府面临一个两难：如何在不破坏法律确定性或违反程序保障的情况下，纠正过去十年的司法任命和裁决？

In Hungary, the task facing Péter Magyar will be even more daunting. Poland’s national-populist experiment lasted “only” eight years; Orbán was in office for 16. Furthermore, while PiS lacked the two-thirds majority needed to fully rewrite the Polish constitution, Orbán successfully enshrined his illiberalism into the foundations of the Hungarian state. Magyar inherits a “captured” state in which loyalists remain entrenched in every public structure, while key sectors of the economy and society – from the media to privatised universities – remain under the control of a pro-Orbán oligarchy.
在匈牙利，佩特尔·马扎尔面临的任务将更加艰巨。波兰的民族民粹主义实验“仅”持续了八年;欧尔班任职 16 年。此外，尽管 PiS 缺乏完全重写波兰宪法所需的三分之二多数，欧尔班却成功将其非自由主义写入匈牙利国家的基础。马扎尔人继承了一个“被占领”的国家，忠诚派依然根深蒂固于每个公共结构中，而经济和社会的关键部门——从媒体到私有化大学——仍由亲欧尔班寡头集团控制。

Magyar is a conservative and former Fidesz insider who has pledged to tackle corruption and restore ties with Europe. He ran a good campaign, crisscrossing the country while maintaining a strong and effective presence on social media. But he inherits a country in a critical condition: since 2020, inflation in Hungary has exceeded 50%, while the country ranks 55th on the Economist’s Democracy Index (between Thailand and Sri Lanka), such that the country would be unable to join the EU if it were applying to do so today.
马扎尔是一名保守派，曾是青民盟内部人士 ，承诺打击腐败并恢复与欧洲的联系。他开展了一场出色的竞选活动，走遍全国，同时在社交媒体上保持强大且有效的存在感。但他接手的国家处于一个危急状态：自 2020 年以来，匈牙利的通胀率已超过 50%， 而该国在《经济学人》民主指数中排名第 55（介于泰国和斯里兰卡之间），因此即使今天申请加入欧盟，也无法实现。

There was something both inevitable and incomplete about Orbán’s defeat. It was inevitable, given the wear and tear of long-term power and the failure to deliver on his own core promises of national grandeur and natalist policy. But his defeat also remains incomplete, because it takes infinitely more time and energy to rebuild than it does to dismantle. The legal vulnerabilities we have seen in Poland – where the levers of power remain beyond the executive’s reach due to a hostile presidency or a contested constitutional tribunal – will be mirrored, and likely amplified, in Hungary. Questions remain about how far Magyar, who now holds the two-thirds majority necessary to amend the constitution, will go in dismantling the system and whether the EU will maintain its pressure to ensure a genuine return to the rule of law.
欧尔班的失败既不可避免又不完整。鉴于长期权力的消耗以及未能兑现他自身关于国家宏伟和生育主义政策的核心承诺，这场选举是不可避免的。但他的失败同样不完整，因为重建所需的时间和精力远远超过拆解。我们在波兰看到的法律脆弱性——由于敌对的总统任期或有争议的宪法法庭，权力杠杆依然超出行政部门的掌控——将在匈牙利被映照，甚至可能被放大。关于目前拥有修宪所需三分之二多数的马扎尔政府，会在拆解该体系方面走多远，以及欧盟是否会持续施压以确保真正回归法治，仍存在疑问。

This difficulty is compounded by what we might call the Trump factor. Just as Donald Trump has shown that a populist movement can survive and even thrive after losing power, Orbán’s brand of politics is now deeply rooted in Hungary. Orbán is only 62, and with his American ally providing a blueprint for the comeback narrative, he will probably wait for the new coalition to struggle with the realities of a broken economy. He will be betting on the frustration of voters when the historic change they voted for fails to produce an instant miracle. As Orbán said on Sunday evening after conceding defeat: “We never give up. This is one thing people know about us: we never give up.”
这种困难还因我们所谓的特朗普因素而加剧。正如唐纳德·特朗普证明了民粹主义运动在失去权力后依然可以存活甚至繁荣，欧尔班的政治风格如今已深深扎根于匈牙利。欧尔班只有62岁，而他的美国盟友为复出叙事提供了蓝图，他很可能会等待新联盟来应对破碎经济的现实。他将押注选民在他们投票支持的历史性变革未能带来瞬间奇迹时的沮丧。正如欧尔班在周日晚承认失败后所说：“我们从不放弃。人们知道我们从不放弃。”

The electoral upset in Budapest follows another significant setback for the national-populist front: Giorgia Meloni’s failure to pass her constitutional referendum on judicial reform in Italy. The Italian case is complex and serves as a powerful double-edged lesson. On the one hand, it confirms that even the most pragmatic-looking populists eventually seek to weaken the independence of the judiciary to consolidate executive power. On the other, it proves that institutional counter-powers and public opinion can still act as effective roadblocks. Yet Meloni remains both in power and notably popular, demonstrating that a populist leader can survive a defeat without losing their political grip. This ambivalence highlights the resilience of these rightwing movements: they can be checked, but they are rarely dismissed with a single blow.
布达佩斯的选举爆冷紧随民族民粹阵线的又一重大挫折之后： 乔治娅·梅洛尼未能通过她关于意大利司法改革的宪法公投。意大利的案例复杂，是一个强有力的双刃剑教训。一方面，这证实了即使是看起来最务实的民粹主义者，最终也会试图削弱司法独立以巩固行政权力。另一方面，这证明了体制上的反对力量和公众舆论依然可以成为有效的障碍。然而，梅洛尼依然掌权且极受欢迎，证明了民粹主义领导人即使失败也能在政治影响力不失落的情况下存活下来。这种矛盾情绪凸显了这些右翼运动的韧性：它们可以被制衡，但很少能被一击击溃。

Sunday’s election was a victory not just at, but for the ballot box, and people are right to treat it with enthusiasm. But we must acknowledge that national populism is designed to survive the downfall of its creators. The Hungarian people have ended Orbán’s reign, but the work of reclaiming their state has only just begun. If Magyar’s new government cannot navigate the legal traps left behind, the ghost of the old regime – and its allies in Washington and Moscow – will be ready to return. In the history of populism, the first defeat is rarely the last.
周日的选举不仅是选票上的胜利 ， 更是选票上的胜利，人们对此充满热情是正确的。但我们必须承认，民族民粹主义是为了在其创造者倒台后生存而设计的。匈牙利人民结束了欧尔班的统治，但收复国家的工作才刚刚开始。如果马扎尔新政府无法摆脱留下的法律陷阱，旧政权的幽灵——以及其在华盛顿和莫斯科的盟友——将准备回归。在民粹主义历史上，第一次失败很少是最后一次。